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Abstract
We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in cen-
tralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-
telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced
by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in
the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the
observations of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted
to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant
strategy most participants of the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences.
JEL Classification: C78, D81, J44.
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1 Introduction
In entry-level professional labor markets new workers search for their first positions at
firms. Such markets differ in how they match workers and firms. In a decentralized
market, workers and firms are themselves responsible in looking for partners. For
example, in the first half of the 20th century the entry-level medical markets in the
United States and the United Kingdom were decentralized. This had the effect that
hospitals (the firms) were offering promising medical students (or workers) earlier
and earlier contracts.1 By the 1950s students often signed a contract two years before
finishing. This caused inefficiencies and subsequent regret among the participants of
the entry-level medical market: either the student did not develop as expected and
the hospital could have later hired a better physician or the student developed much
better than expected and could have gotten a job at a better hospital. Thus, the
realized matching was often unstable: some students and hospitals were committed
to now unacceptable partners or unmatched pairs were preferring each other to their
committed partners. Due to these problems entry-level medical markets in the U.S.
were reorganized from the 1950s by centralizing them through the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP). Each year a clearinghouse announces the open positions
at each hospital and the finishing medical students which will be available (around
20,000 per year). Salaries are not negotiated and included in the job description.
Therefore, each participant’s preference is a ranking over his potential partners. Then
all participants submit their preference lists to the clearinghouse and a mechanism
determines a matching for the submitted lists. In other words, a centralized matching
market together with a mechanism induces a preference revelation game. The success
of the reorganizations depended on which mechanism was used in determining the
matching between students and hospitals. A mechanism is stable if it always selects a
stable matching of the declared profile. It has been observed that stable mechanisms
1Roth and Xing (1994) and Niederle and Roth (2003) describe other entry-level professional labor
markets experiencing unravelling of appointment dates.
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perform better than unstable ones.2
There is a considerable amount of literature analyzing strategic incentives in cen-
tralized matching markets when the submitted lists are common knowledge among
the participants. A central result is that no stable mechanism exists for which stating
the true preferences is a dominant strategy for every agent under complete informa-
tion (Roth, 1982). Thus, for any stable mechanism there are situations at which some
agents gain by manipulation. So¨nmez (1999) showed for general allocation problems
with indivisibilities that a mechanism is incentive-compatible (truth-telling is a dom-
inant strategy), Pareto-optimal and individually rational only if for each profile the
core is a singleton and the mechanism chooses this allocation. Since a matching mar-
ket may not have a singleton core and stability implies both individual rationality and
Pareto-optimality in our model, So¨nmez’s result implies in our model Roth’s (1982)
result.
Roth and Peranson (1999) have examined submitted preference lists by hospitals
and students in the National Residents Matching Program for the years 1987, 1993,
1994, 1995, and 1996 and found that the number of stable matchings for the submitted
profiles were surprisingly small. To explain this unexpected fact, Roth and Peranson
(1999) suggest the following conjecture (they call it a new kind of “core convergence”
result):3 As the size of the market increases, the number of stable matchings becomes
smaller provided that each participant only ranks (in his/her reported preference
ordering) at most a fixed number of positions (which remains small when the number
of participants increase). Moreover, the small size of the core suggests limited ability
to benefit from manipulating submitted preferences. Thus, Roth and Peranson (1999)
infer that a significant number of participants truthfully reveal their preferences.
Under the more realistic context of incomplete information, our paper will show in a
2Niederle and Roth (2003) report the existence of about 100 markets and submarkets organized
via stable mechanisms and that only 3 of them were abandoned after being used for several years.
3It is well-known that in the two-sided, one-to-one matching markets the effective coalitions are
only individuals or pairs, and hence, the core coincides with the set of stable matchings.
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simplified matching market why participants truthfully reveal their preferences and
the cores of the submitted lists are small.
In centralized matching markets the common knowledge assumption of the sub-
mitted lists is extremely strong. Thus, we will consider preference revelation games
induced by a stable mechanism under incomplete information. Agents have a common
belief and their beliefs of the others’ submitted lists are calculated through Bayes’
rule for every realization of an individual preference relation. Any stable mechanism
is ordinal, i.e., it determines the stable matching through the submitted ordinal rank-
ings. Thus, truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for every von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function submitting the induced ordinal ranking maximizes the
agent’s expected utility in the Bayesian revelation game induced by the common be-
lief and the stable mechanism.4 This requirement is equivalent to the concept of
ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium which is based on first-order stochastic dominance
in the sense that each agent plays a best response to the others’ strategies for every
von Neumann-Morgenstern representation. We show in Theorem 1 that truth-telling
is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the Bayesian revelation game induced by
a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if the support of the common
belief is contained in the set of profiles with singleton core. Our result matches the
following of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the NRMP: (i) they observed that the cores
of the submitted lists are small and (ii) they conjecture that a significant number of
participants truthfully reveal their preferences.
Theorem 1 is the first result for matching problems which relates singleton cores
to incentive-compatibility in an incomplete information setup. For matching mar-
kets it extends So¨nmez (1999) by allowing information to be incomplete and it con-
firms the importance of singleton cores for incentive-compatibility of stable mech-
anisms. Because dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility is equivalent to requir-
4This notion was introduced by d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988) who call it “ordinal Bayesian
incentive-compatibility”. Majumdar and Sen (2004) use it to relax strategy-proofness in the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.
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ing Bayesian incentive-compatibility for all common beliefs, for stable mechanisms
the need for singleton cores is very robust and persists even if dominant-strategy
incentive-compatibility is given up and instead Bayesian incentive-compatibility for
one common belief is adopted.
Two recent papers have identified strong but meaningful sufficient conditions on
preference profiles under which the core of a matching market is a singleton. Eeck-
hout (2000) proposes a condition, which is also necessary for markets with a small
number of participants, that includes the following two special cases. (1) Vertical
heterogeneity, where all firms have identical preferences over workers (for instance,
according to the student’s grades) and all workers have identical preferences over firms
(for instance, according to a public and objective ranking of hospitals). (2) Horizontal
heterogeneity, where all agents have different preferences over the other side of the
market, but each agent has a different most preferred partner and in addition is the
most preferred by this partner. Clark (2003) proposes a (stronger) sufficient condition
(called the No Crossing Condition), which is closely related to the well-known Single
Crossing Condition.
We also argue why, even under the assumption of a common belief, (1) there
are other ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria in which agents misreport their prefer-
ences, and (2) members of couples jointly looking for jobs do not have incentives to
misrepresent coordinately their preferences at a truth-telling ordinal Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the game induced by a stable mechanism.
We complement Theorem 1 in Theorem 2 by showing that a list of strategies is
an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the Bayesian revelation game induced by a
belief and a stable mechanism only if for each preference profile in the support of the
common belief all agents unanimously agree that the matching selected by the stable
mechanism for the declared preference lists is most preferred among all matchings
in the core. This suggests a new and additional reason, based on the incomplete
information nature of real matching markets, of why stable mechanisms last and why
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cores are small.
Our paper is the first complete analysis of equilibria of preference revelation games
induced by stable mechanisms when participants have incomplete information about
the ordinal preferences of all other agents.5 Roth and Rothblum (1999), Ehlers (2002),
and Ehlers (2004) provide advice on the list that a particular worker should submit to
the clearinghouse, given her uncertainty about the rankings submitted by the other
participants. These papers give advice under different hypothesis on the information
structure of the beliefs held by the worker and for different mechanisms. Following the
mechanism design literature on direct revelation games under incomplete information
we assume that agents have a common belief on the set of all profiles which may
limit (as in all games with incomplete information) the applicability of our results.
However, note that a priori we do not impose any condition on the common belief
(such as symmetry of agents’ beliefs or independence). Furthermore we consider a
simplified one-to-one version of matching markets. Nevertheless one-to-one matching
markets are a reasonable approximation of many-to-one matching markets. Think of
each firm representing a department of a hospital and suppose that each department
has at most one position for its medical specialty. Each department possesses its own
ranking over students. Then Theorem 1 remains unchanged if several departments
together are allowed to misrepresent their true preferences, i.e. hospitals cannot
misrepresent their preferences such that each department strictly gains. Moreover,
one-to-one matching markets may arise for instance in regional medical markets for a
certain specialty where each institution has (at most) one position for this speciality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the matching market and
preference revelation games. Section 3 introduces incomplete information in these
games and ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Section 4 contains the result for truth-
5Roth (1989) contains the first strategic analysis of games with incomplete information (on the
profile of utility functions) induced by stable mechanisms using expected utility. He shows that the
most important results concerning dominant and dominated strategies carry over from complete
information to (cardinal) incomplete information whereas results concerning Nash equilibria do not.
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telling. Section 5 focuses on general ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria. Section 6
concludes. The Appendix collects all the proofs.
2 The Matching Market
The agents in our market consist of two disjoint sets, the set of firms F and the set
of workers W . Generic agents are denoted by v ∈ V ≡ F ∪W while generic firms
and workers are denoted by f and w, respectively. Each worker w ∈ W has a strict,
transitive, and complete preference relation Pw over F ∪ {w}, and each firm f ∈ F
has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation Pf over W ∪ {f}. Let Pv
denote the set of all preference relations of agent v. In order to compare (potentially)
identical partners of v according to the preference relation Pv we denote by Rv the
binary relation where for all v′, v̂ ∈ V , v′Rvv̂ means that either v′ = v̂ or v′Pvv̂. Given
Pw ∈ Pw and v ∈ F ∪{w}, let B(v, Pw) denote the weak upper contour set of Pw at v;
i.e., B(v, Pw) = {v′ ∈ F ∪ {w} | v′Rwv}. Let A(Pw) denote the set of firms which are
acceptable to w under Pw; i.e., A(Pw) = {f ∈ F | fPww}. Given Pw and a subset of
firms S ⊆ F , let Pw|S denote the strict ordering on S consistent with Pw. Similarly,
given Pf ∈ Pf , v ∈ W ∪ {f} and S ⊆ W , we define B(v, Pf ), A(Pf ) and Pf |S. Let
P ≡ ×v∈VPv. Elements of P are called (preference) profiles. To emphasize the role
of agent v’s preference in the profile P ∈ P we will write it as (Pv, P−v).
A matching market is a triple (F,W, P ), where F is a set of firms, W is a set
of workers, and P is a preference profile. Because F and W will remain fixed, a
matching market is simply a profile P ∈ P . The assignment problem consists of
matching workers with firms, keeping the bilateral nature of their relationship and
allowing for the possibility that both, firms and workers, may remain unmatched.
Namely, a matching is a function µ : V → V satisfying the following properties: (m1)
for all w ∈ W , µ (w) ∈ F ∪ {w}; (m2) for all f ∈ F , µ (f) ∈ W ∪ {f}; and (m3) for
all v ∈ V , µ (µ (v)) = v. We say that agent v is unmatched under µ if µ (v) = v. Let
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M denote the set of all matchings.6
A matching is stable if no worker or firm prefers to be unmatched (individual ratio-
nality) and no unmatched pair mutually prefer each other to their assigned partners
(pair-wise stability). Namely, given a profile P ∈ P a matching µ ∈M is stable under
P if (s1) for all v ∈ V , µ (v)Rvv; and (s2) there exists no pair (w, f) ∈ W × F such
that fPwµ (w) and wPfµ (f). Gale and Shapley (1962) show that the set of stable
matchings under P is non-empty and coincides with the core of the matching market
P ; that is, there is no loss of generality if we assume that all blocking power is carried
out only by individual agents and by worker-firm pairs. We denote by C (P ) the set
of stable matchings under P (or the core induced by P ). Given a profile P ∈ P a
matching µ ∈ M is Pareto-optimal if there exists no matching µ′ ∈ M such that
µ′(v)Rvµ(v) for all v ∈ V with strict preference holding for at least one agent.
The core of a matching market has a lattice structure (Knuth (1976) attributes
this result to John Conway; see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for the formal statement
and proof of this result). Therefore, the core of a matching market contains two
stable matchings, µF and µW , the two extremes of the complete lattice (called the
firms-optimal stable matching and the workers-optimal stable matching, respectively)
which have the property that firms (workers) unanimously agree that µF (µW ) is the
best stable matching; moreover, the optimal stable matching for one side of the market
is the worst stable matching for the other side.
Whether or not a matching is stable depends on the preferences of agents, and
since they constitute private information, agents have to be asked about them. A
mechanism requires each agent v to report some preference relation Pv ∈ Pv and
associates a matching with the reported profile. Formally, a mechanism is a function
ϕ : P → M mapping each preference profile P ∈ P to a matching ϕ [P ] ∈ M.
Therefore, ϕ [P ] (v) is the agent matched to v at preference profile P by mechanism
6We are following the convention of extending the preference relation Pv from the original set
of potential partners to the set of all matchings M by identifying a matching µ with µ (v). For
instance, to say that firm f prefers µ′ to µ means that either µ′ (f) = µ (f) or µ′ (f)Pfµ (f).
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ϕ. A mechanism ϕ is stable if for all P ∈ P , ϕ [P ] ∈ C (P ).
The deferred-acceptance algorithm defined by Gale and Shapley (1962) is a stable
mechanism that produces either µF or µW depending on the side of the market that
makes the offers. At any step of the algorithm in which firms make offers (denoted
by DAF : P → M), each firm f proposes to the most-preferred worker among
the set of workers that have not already rejected f during previous steps, while a
worker w accepts the most-preferred firm among the set of current offers plus the
firm provisionally matched to w in the previous step (if any). The algorithm stops at
the step when either all offers are accepted or firms have no more acceptable workers
to whom they want to make an offer; the provisional matching becomes then definite
and is the stable matching µF ; i.e., DAF [P ] = µF for all P ∈ P . Symmetrically if
workers make offers, and the outcome of the algorithm (denoted by DAW : P →M)
is the stable matching µW ; i.e., DAW [P ] = µW for all P ∈ P .7
When each agent has complete information about the preference relations of all
other agents then: (1) No stable mechanism exists for which stating the true pref-
erences is a dominant strategy for every agent (Roth, 1982). (2) Truth-telling is a
dominant strategy for one side of the market if the deferred-acceptance algorithm
selects that side’s optimal stable matching (Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth
(1982)). Therefore, if the core is singleton for a matching market, then the deferred-
acceptance algorithm chooses the same matching independently of the side which
makes offers. However, in general this fact does not allow us to conclude that for any
stable mechanism truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium whenever the true profile has a
singleton core.
7Strictly speaking, the DA-algorithm is an algorithm that finds the matching chosen by the “DA-
mechanism”. However, most of the matching literature uses the term DA-algorithm when referring
to both the algorithm and the mechanism. We follow this convention.
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3 Incomplete Information
We give up the usual assumption that the submitted lists are common knowledge
and consider Bayesian preference revelation games induced by a stable mechanism
and a common belief which is shared among all agents. A common belief over P
is a probability distribution P˜ over P . Given v ∈ V , let P˜v denote the marginal
distribution of P˜ over Pv. Given a common belief P˜ and a preference relation Pv,
let P˜−v|Pv denote the probability distribution over P−v conditional on Pv.8 Given a
common belief P˜ , (i) information is complete if P˜ puts probability one on a unique
profile P ∈ P and (ii) information is incomplete if information is not complete.
A random matching µ˜ is a probability distribution over the set of matchings M.
Let µ˜ (v) denote the probability distribution which µ˜ induces over v’s set of potential
partners (F ∪ {w} if v = w and W ∪ {f} if v = f).9
A mechanism ϕ and a common belief P˜ define an (ordinal) game of incomplete
information as follows. A strategy of v is a function sv : Pv → Pv specifying for each
type of v a list that v submits to the mechanism. A strategy profile is a list s = (sv)v∈V
associating with each agent a strategy. Given a mechanism ϕ : P →M and a common
belief P˜ over P , a strategy profile s : P → P induces a random matching in the follow-
ing way: for all µ ∈ M, Pr{P˜ = P | ϕ[s (P )] = µ} is the probability of matching µ.
However, the relevant random matching for agent v, given his type Pv and a strategy
profile s, is ϕ[sv(Pv), s−v(P˜−v|Pv)] (where s−v(P˜−v|Pv) is the probability distribution
over P−v which s−v induces conditional on Pv). Note that ϕ[sv (Pv) , s−v(P˜−v|Pv)] (v)
is the distribution which the random matching ϕ[sv (Pv) , s−v(P˜−v|Pv)] induces over
v’s set of potential partners.
All mechanisms used in centralized matching markets are ordinal. In other words
the only relevant information for a mechanism are the agents’ rankings over their sets
8Note that we do not impose any condition on the common belief such as symmetry of agents’
beliefs or independence.
9Formally, if v = w, then Pr{µ˜(v) = f} = ∑µ∈M:µ(v)=fPr{µ˜ = µ} for all f ∈ F and Pr{µ˜(v) =
v} =∑µ∈M:µ(v)=vPr{µ˜ = µ}.
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of potential partners. In this environment truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
whenever for every von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM)-utility submitting the induced
ordinal ranking maximizes an agent’s expected utility in the Bayesian preference
revelation game induced by the common belief and the mechanism. Equivalently,
truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium (OBNE) if the distribution over
his partners when reporting the true ranking first-order stochastically dominates any
distribution over his partners when submitting another ranking (given the others’
strategies and the common belief).
A random matching µ˜ first-order stochastically Pf−dominates a random matching
µ˜′, denoted by µ˜ (f) mPf µ˜′ (f), if for all v ∈ W ∪ {f} , Pr{µ˜ (f) ∈ B(v, Pf )} ≥
Pr{µ˜′(f) ∈ B(v, Pf )}. Similarly, µ˜ (w) mPw µ˜′ (w) means that random matching µ˜
first-order stochastically Pw−dominates random matching µ˜′.
Definition 1 Let P˜ be a common belief over P. Then truth-telling is an Ordinal
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (OBNE) in the mechanism ϕ iff for all v ∈ V and all
Pv ∈ Pv such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0 we have
ϕ[Pv, P˜−v|Pv ](v)mPv ϕ[P ′v, P˜−v|Pv ](v)
for all P ′v ∈ Pv.
More generally, a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium when-
ever for any agent’s true ordinal preference submitting the ranking specified by his
strategy maximizes his expected utility for every vNM-utility representation of his
true preference. This requires that an agent’s strategy only depends on the ordinal
ranking induced by his vNM-utility function. Of course, this is true for truth-telling.
Furthermore, ordinal strategies are meaningful if an agent only observes his ordinal
ranking and may have (still) little information about his utilities of his potential
partners.
Definition 2 Let P˜ be a common belief over P. Then a strategy profile s is an
Ordinal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (OBNE) in the mechanism ϕ iff for all v ∈ V
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and all Pv ∈ Pv such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0 we have
ϕ[sv(Pv), s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v)mPv ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v)
for all P ′v ∈ Pv.10
Observe that for any common belief the set of OBNE in a mechanism ϕ is non-
empty. For instance, the constant strategy in which all agents declare that no agent
in the other side of the market is acceptable is an OBNE in ϕ since the mechanism
selects, at all profiles P and (P−v, P ′v), the empty matching. Furthermore, for any
stable mechanism ϕ, any matching µ can be connected to an OBNE sµ in ϕ in the
following way: for any v ∈ V and any Pv ∈ Pv, let A(sµv (Pv)) = {µ(v)} if µ(v) ∈ A(Pv)
and let A(sµv (Pv)) = ∅ otherwise. Then sµ is an OBNE in ϕ under any common belief
because for any preference relation Pv, agent v ranks either as the unique acceptable
match the agent specified by µ (if this agent is acceptable under Pv) or no partner
acceptable. If information is complete, then any sµ is a Nash equilibrium in ϕ and the
outcomes of the strategies sµ is the set of all individually rational and Pareto-optimal
matchings. Both under complete and incomplete information there is a multiplicity
of OBNE. Remark 2 in Section 4 further illustrates that the multiplicity of equilibria
is a robust property of the direct revelation game (under incomplete information)
induced by a stable mechanism even under very strong properties of the common
belief, included those that “transform” the game into a game of complete information.
4 Truth-Telling and Singleton Cores
We will show that the observation that the cores of the submitted lists are small
(Roth and Peranson, 1999) and that participants reveal their true preferences are
10In the definition of an OBNE optimal behavior of agent v is only required for the preferences
of v which arise with positive probability under P˜ . If Pv ∈ Pv is such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} = 0, then
the conditional belief P˜−v|Pv cannot be derived from P˜ . However, we could complete the belief of v
in the following way: let P˜−v|Pv put probability one on a profile where all other agents submit lists
which do not contain v.
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intimately related in our simplified matching market since both have a simple and
simultaneous equilibrium explanation.
We will be interested in the profiles with a singleton core. The support of P˜ is the
set of profiles on which P˜ puts a positive weight. Formally, for all P ∈ P , P belongs
to the support of P˜ if and only if Pr{P˜ = P} > 0.
Theorem 1 Let P˜ be a common belief. Then truth-telling is an OBNE in a stable
mechanism if and only if the support of P˜ is contained in the set of all profiles with
a singleton core.
By Theorem 1, participants truthfully reveal their true preference because the
submitted lists have a singleton core. Profiles with a singleton core can arise very
easily. For instance, let each hospital offer a position for a certain medical speciality
and suppose that each hospital ranks as acceptable only the students who studied
its position specific speciality. Furthermore, suppose that all hospitals who have a
position for specialty A rank the students who studied speciality A in the same way,
say according to some objective criterion like their grades. Then, independently of
the students’ preferences, the core is always a singleton. Now if the common belief
is such that any profile in its support has the properties as described above, then
Theorem 1 applies and each participant cannot do better than truthfully reveal his
preferences.
Remark 1 Theorem 1 can be read as truth-telling is an OBNE if and only if
the support of P˜ is contained in the profiles for which under complete information
truth-telling is a best response to the other’s strategies. Obviously Theorem 1 is
not necessarily true in general Bayesian games. For instance, consider the game of
matching pennies. Interpret each of the two player’s strategies (heads or tails) as
his possible types. If each player’s type arises with the same probability, then truth-
telling is an OBNE but under complete information there is no Nash Equilibrium in
pure strategies.11
11We conjecture that the existence of OBNE hinges crucially on the “strong indivisibilities” prop-
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Remark 2 Of course, truth-telling is not the unique OBNE in a stable mechanism
even when the support of P˜ is contained in the set of all profiles with a singleton
core. To see this, let {P 1, ..., PK} be an arbitrary set of profiles with the property
that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K and all v ∈ V , ∣∣C (P k)∣∣ = 1 and
P k
′
v 6= P kv for all k′ 6= k. (1)
For each k, let µk be an individually rational matching relative to the profile P k and let
ϕ be a stable mechanism. We know, by Roth and Sotomayor (1990), that there exists
P¯ k ∈ P such that ϕ[P¯ k] = µk and P¯ k is a NE of the direct preference revelation game
induced by ϕ. Observe that, in general, P¯ k is not equal to P k. Let P˜ be a common
belief over P with support on {P 1, ..., PK}. Consider any strategy profile s = (sv)v∈V ,
where sv : Pv → Pv has the property that sv
(
P kv
)
= P¯ kv for all k and all v ∈ V . It
is immediate to see that, since condition (1) holds and P¯ k is a NE of the complete
information game induced by the mechanism ϕ (with preferences P k), s is an OBNE
in the stable mechanism ϕ. However, this equilibrium is arbitrary and without much
predictive power since it requires extremely large amounts of coordination among all
agents. In contrast, truth-telling arises as a natural and simple behavior in large
markets where this coordination is literally unfeasible.
Remark 3 Much attention has been paid to the incentives that members of a
couple who want to live together face when looking coordinately for two jobs in entry-
level professional markets (see Roth (1984a), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Dutta and
Masso´ (1997), Roth and Peranson (1999), Cantala (2002), Roth (2002), Klaus and
Klijn (2005), and Klaus, Klijn and Masso´ (2006)). A straightforward extension of the
proof of Theorem 1 shows that, under its assumptions, no couple can misrepresent
coordinately their preferences in a stable mechanism ϕ such that both members of the
couple strictly benefit. To see this, let P˜ be a common belief with support contained
erty (which induces a “natural ordinality”) in a matching market and that this does not necessarily
remain true for general NTU or TU games (where no natural ordinality is induced; these games are
cardinal).
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in the set of all profiles with a singleton core. Let w and w′ be a couple and assume
that all remaining agents are truth-telling. Because in the stable mechanism DAW
no subset of workers can gain by jointly misrepresenting their preferences we have
that, similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1, for all P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0,
ϕ [P ] (v)Rvϕ[P
′
w, P
′
w′ , P−{w,w′}] (v) for v = w or v = w
′.
Therefore, truth-telling is a joint best response for the couple w and w′. Note that
the same is true for any set of firms, i.e. truth-telling is a best response for any
set of firms. Thus, if each firm represents the department of a hospital and each
department has at most one open position (in its medical speciality), then hospitals
cannot misrepresent the preferences of their departments such that all departments
strictly gain.
Remark 4 In matching markets So¨nmez’s (1999) result says the following:
Let ϕ : P → M be a mechanism choosing for each profile P ∈ P an individually
rational and Pareto-optimal matching. If for all v ∈ V and all Pv ∈ Pv, Pv is a
(weakly) dominant strategy in the game induced by ϕ at Pv
12, then |C(P )| = 1 for all
P ∈ P.
The following are the important differences between So¨nmez’s result and Theorem
1. First, So¨nmez (1999) requires full incentive-compatibility (for all v ∈ V and all
Pv ∈ Pv) whereas we only require Bayesian incentive-compatibility (for all v ∈ V and
all Pv ∈ Pv such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0. Under complete information (say under
P ) Bayesian incentive-compatibility reduces to the requirement that P is one of the
Nash equlibria of the preference revelation game induced by the mechanism ϕ and P .
Second, since in matching markets stability implies Pareto-optimality and individual
rationality, our requirement on the mechanism is stronger than in So¨nmez (1999).
Third, in Theorem 1 “singleton cores” is both a necessary and sufficient condition.13
12For all P ′v ∈ Pv and all P−v ∈ P−v, ϕ[Pv, P−v](v)Rvϕ[P ′v, P−v](v)
13Takamiya (2003) showed that the converse of So¨nmez’s general result is not necessarily true:
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5 Ex-post Unanimity and Small Cores
Theorem 1 characterized the common beliefs for which a specific strategy profile
is an OBNE. In this result the singleton core condition on the common belief was
independent of which stable mechanism is used. The key feature of the mechanism
was its stability and not whether workers or firms make proposals like in the DA-
algorithm.
Generally, however, whether a strategy profile is an OBNE may depend on the
stable mechanism. We will generalize the necessary condition of Theorem 1. We will
show that a necessary condition for a strategy profile to be an OBNE is that for any
profile belonging to the support of the common belief, the stable mechanism chooses
the matching which is unanimously most preferred in the core of the submitted profile.
This is more likely when the core of the submitted profile is “small” in terms of the
true profile. If the submitted profile is one with singleton core (like in Theorem 1),
then this condition is trivially satisfied.
Theorem 2 Let P˜ be a common belief, s be a strategy profile, and ϕ be a stable
mechanism. If s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ, then any profile belonging
to the support of P˜ has the following property: all agents unanimously agree that the
matching chosen by ϕ for the submitted profile is most preferred among all matchings
in the core of the submitted profile. Formally, for all P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0,
we have ϕ[s(P )](v)Rvµ(v) for all v ∈ V and all µ ∈ C(s(P )).
If a common belief, a strategy profile and a mechanism satisfy the ex-post una-
nimity condition of Theorem 2, then by strictness of preferences, for any (true) profile
P belonging to the support there is a unique matching µ in the core of the submitted
profile which is most preferred under the true profile and which has to be chosen by
the mechanism, i.e., µ = ϕ[s(P )]. This implies that the belief cannot attribute posi-
tive probability to a profile where some agents’ preferences are opposed for any two
there are general allocation problems with indivisibilities where the core is a singleton for each profile
but the mechanism choosing the unique core allocation for each profile is not incentive-compatible.
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matchings belonging to the core of the submitted profile. However, ex-post unanimity
does not require that the core of the submitted profile is a singleton.
Generally, the condition in Theorem 2 is not sufficient for a profile of strategies to
be an OBNE.14 Whether or not it is satisfied depends on both the stable mechanism
and the agents’ strategies. Furthermore, this condition is not sufficient for the core
of the submitted profile to be a singleton since ex-post unanimity is in terms of the
true profile.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis of ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms under incom-
plete information confirms some already known reasons of why stable mechanisms
arose and lasted for many years in centralized two-sided matching markets, and sug-
gests some additional ones. First, under incomplete information, truth-telling remains
a plausible behavior if and only if the cores of the support of the common belief are
singleton; hence, the stability of the realized matching is guaranteed. This is an im-
portant property and becomes critical if the market has to be redesigned. Second,
this feature of equilibrium behavior is independent of the chosen stable mechanism.
This is significant since the two sides of the matching market have opposite interests
on the set of stable matchings (and thus, on possible alternative stable mechanisms).
Third, equilibrium is reinforced because each participant is matched to the best pos-
sible partner, that is, the partner most preferred among those he is matched to by
any stable matching relative to the declared profile.
At a more conceptual level, one may ask why a centralized market mechanism
14For instance, let P˜ be a belief putting probability one on a profile P under which all agents
rank acceptable all potential partners. Further let s(P ) be such that each worker truthfully reveals
her preference and each firm submits an empty list (ranking all workers unacceptable). Then the
condition in Theorem 2 is satisfied but s(P ) is obviously not an OBNE. Any firm gains by revealing
its true preference.
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is needed when truth-telling is an equilibrium. The problem is that in decentralized
markets there are frictions because it is difficult for agents to communicate with all
possible partners to find out their preferences. Furthermore, during this search agents
are unlikely to reveal their complete preferences and unravelling may occur.
Overall, we (unexpectedly) found that the more realistic and potentially richer
strategic setting of incomplete information reinforces some of the reasons already
given to explain why many of the entry-level professional labor markets have been
operating in a relatively smooth way for so many years.
All our results apply to a simplified one-to-one version of matching markets. Al-
though one-to-one matching markets are a reasonable approximation of many-to-one
matching markets, the following example, based on So¨nmez (1997), shows that Theo-
rem 1 does not generalize from one-to-one matching markets to many-to-one matching
markets.
Example 1 Consider a matching market with two firms F = {f1, f2} and two
workers W = {w1, w2}. Firm f1 has one position but firm f2 has two positions.
Consider any common belief with support {P, P¯}, where P and P¯ differ in firm f2’s
preference and are the following. The profile P is
Pf1 Pf2 Pw1 Pw2
w1 {w1, w2} f2 f1
w2 w2 f1 f2
w1
,
and the profile P¯ is
P¯f1 P¯f2 P¯w1 P¯w2
w1 w2 f2 f1
w2 f1 f2
.
Both profiles have singleton cores: C(P ) = {µ} where µ(w1) = f2 and µ(w2) = f1;
and C(P¯ ) = {µ¯} where µ¯(w1) = f1 and µ¯(w2) = f2. Nevertheless it is in firm f2’s
best interest to report preference P¯f2 , even when its true preference is Pf2 . Thus,
19
truth-telling is not an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this example although
each profile in the support of the common belief has singleton core.
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APPENDIX
In the Appendix we prove Theorems 1 and 2.
A Truth-Telling
Theorem 1 Let P˜ be a common belief. Then truth-telling is an OBNE in a stable
mechanism if and only if the support of P˜ is contained in the set of all profiles with
a singleton core.
Proof. Let ϕ be a stable mechanism.
(⇐) Let P˜ be such that for all P ∈ P , Pr{P˜ = P} > 0 implies |C(P )| = 1. Let
P ∈ P be such that |C(P )| = 1. We show that under complete information P is a
Nash Equilibrium in the direct preference revelation game induced by ϕ. We show
that Pv is a best response to P−v for all v ∈ V .
Let v ∈ W . By |C(P )| = 1,
DAW [P ] = ϕ[P ]. (2)
Truth-telling is dominant strategy for v under DAW (Dubins and Freedman, 1981;
Roth, 1982). However, in general this fact does not allow us to conclude that Pv is
a best response to P−v for v under the stable mechanism ϕ. We will show that for
any possible deviation of v at ϕ, there exists a deviation of v at DAW such that v is
matched to the same partner as under v’s deviation at ϕ.
Let P ′v ∈ Pv. Let P ′′v ∈ Pv be such that A(P ′′v ) = {ϕ[P ′v, P−v](v)} if ϕ[P ′v, P−v] (v) ∈
F and A (P ′′v ) = ∅ if ϕ[P ′v, P−v] (v) = v. By construction of P ′′v and stability of ϕ,
ϕ[P ′v, P−v] ∈ C(P ′v, P−v) implies ϕ[P ′v, P−v] ∈ C(P ′′v , P−v). Since the set of unmatched
agents is identical under any two stable matchings, the stability of DAW and the
construction of P ′′v yield
DAW [P
′′
v , P−v](v) = ϕ[P
′
v, P−v](v). (3)
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Because for DAW a worker cannot gain by misrepresentation we have
DAW [P ](v)RvDAW [P
′′
v , P−v](v). (4)
Hence, by (2), (3), and (4), ϕ[P ](v)Rvϕ[P
′
v, P−v](v), the desired conclusion.
Using |C(P )| = 1 and DAF [P ] = ϕ[P ], similarly as above it follows that for all
v ∈ F and all P ′v ∈ Pv, ϕ[P ](v)Rvϕ[P ′v, P−v](v).
Let v ∈ V and Pv ∈ Pv be such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0. Because for all P−v ∈ P−v
such that Pr{P˜−v|Pv = P−v} > 0 we have |C(Pv, P−v)| = 1 and under complete
information Pv is a best response to P−v in the direct preference revelation game, it
follows that submitting Pv is a best response for agent v. Hence, truth-telling is an
OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ.
(⇒) Suppose that there exists P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0 and |C(P )| ≥ 2.
Then (i) there exists w ∈ W such that DAW [P ](w)Pwϕ[P ](w) or (ii) there exists
f ∈ F such that DAF [P ](f)Pfϕ[P ](f). Without loss of generality, suppose that
(i) holds. Let DAW [P ](w) = f
′. Let P ′w ∈ Pw be such that P ′w|F = Pw|F and
A(P ′w) = B(f
′, Pw).
Let P ′−w ∈ P−w be such that Pr{P˜ = (Pw, P ′−w)} > 0. Since we will show that
truth-telling is not an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ by looking at the probability
Pr{ϕ[Pw, P˜−w|Pw ] (w) ∈ B (f ′, Pw)}, assume P ′−w is such that ϕ[Pw, P ′−w](w)Rwf ′.
Then ϕ[Pw, P
′
−w] ∈ C
(
Pw, P
′
−w
)
implies ϕ[Pw, P
′
−w] ∈ C(P ′w, P ′−w) since individ-
ual rationality of ϕ[Pw, P
′
−w] at profile
(
Pw, P
′
−w
)
implies individual rationality of
ϕ[Pw, P
′
−w] at profile
(
P ′w, P
′
−w
)
and (wˆ, fˆ) blocks ϕ[Pw, P
′
−w] at profile
(
P ′w, P
′
−w
)
implies (wˆ, fˆ) blocks ϕ[Pw, P
′
−w] at profile
(
Pw, P
′
−w
)
as well. Thus, by A(P ′w) =
B(f ′, Pw) and the fact that under any two stable matchings the set of unmatched
agents is identical, ϕ[P ′w, P
′
−w](w)Rwf
′. We next show that ϕ[P ′w, P−w] (w) = f
′.
Suppose ϕ [P ′w, P−w] (w) = w. Then DAW [P
′
w, P−w] (w) = w. Therefore
DAW [Pw, P−w] (w) = f ′P ′ww = DAW [P
′
w, P−w] (w) ,
which contradicts the fact that for w truth-telling is a dominant strategy in the
direct preference revelation mechanism induced by DAW under complete information.
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A similar argument shows that f ′R′wϕ [P
′
w, P−w] (w). Thus ϕ [P
′
w, P−w] (w) = f
′.
Furthermore, Pr{P˜−w|Pw = P−w} > 0, f ′Pwϕ[P ](w), and ϕ[P ′w, P−w](w) = f ′. Hence,
Pr{ϕ[Pw, P˜−w|Pw ](w) ∈ B(f ′, Pw)} < Pr{ϕ[P ′w, P˜−w|Pw ](w) ∈ B(f ′, Pw)},
which means that truth-telling is not an OBNE in the stable mechanism . 
B Small Cores
Theorem 2 Let P˜ be a common belief, s be a strategy profile, and ϕ be a stable
mechanism. If s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ, then any profile belonging to
the support of P˜ has the following property: for all P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0,
we have ϕ[s(P )](v)Rvµ(v) for all v ∈ V and all µ ∈ C(s(P )).
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exist P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0 and
µ(v)Pvϕ[s(P )](v) for some v ∈ V and µ ∈ C(s(P )). Because ϕ is stable and the set
of unmatched agents is identical under any two stable matchings, we have µ(v) 6= v
and ϕ[s(P )](v) 6= v. Without loss of generality, suppose that v ∈ W , µ(v) = f , and
f is Pv-most preferred in C(s(P )).
Let sv(Pv) = P
′
v. Let P
′′
v ∈ Pv be such that (i) A(P ′′v ) = A(P ′v)∩B(f, Pv) and (ii)
P ′′v |A(P ′′v ) = P ′v|A(P ′′v ). We show that
Pr{ϕ[P ′′v , s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) ∈ B(f, Pv)} > Pr{ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) ∈ B(f, Pv)}, (5)
which contradicts the fact that s is an OBNE.
Let P ′−v ∈ P−v be such that Pr{P˜−v|Pv = P ′−v} > 0 and ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P ′−v)](v) ∈
B(f, Pv). By stability of ϕ, ϕ[P
′
v, s−v(P
′
−v)] ∈ C(P ′v, s−v(P ′−v)). By construction of
P ′′v , ϕ[P
′
v, s−v(P
′
−v)] ∈ C(P ′′v , s−v(P ′−v)). Since the set of unmatched agents is iden-
tical under any two stable matchings, ϕ[P ′v, s−v
(
P ′−v
)
] (v) ∈ B (f, Pv) implies that
ϕ[P ′v, s−v
(
P ′−v
)
] (v) 6= v, and hence ϕ[P ′′v , s−v
(
P ′−v
)
] (v) 6= v. Thus, ϕ[P ′′v , s−v(P ′−v)](v) ∈
A(P ′′v ), and by A(P
′′
v ) ⊆ B(f, Pv), ϕ[P ′′v , s−v(P ′−v)](v) ∈ B(f, Pv).
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By construction of P ′′v and since µ ∈ C(P ′v, s−v(P−v)), µ ∈ C(P ′′v , s−v(P−v)). More-
over, since µ (v) = f and the set of unmatched agents is identical under any two sta-
ble matchings, ϕ[P ′′v , s−v(P−v)](v) 6= v. By A(P ′′v ) ⊆ B(f, Pv), ϕ[P ′′v , s−v(P−v)](v) ∈
B(f, Pv). Furthermore, Pr{P˜−v|Pv = P−v} > 0 and ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P−v)](v) /∈ B(f, Pv).
Hence, (5) is true. 
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